



The Effectiveness of Administrative Dispute Resolution Through the Administrative Court and the Ombudsman in Administrative Disputes

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Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of administrative dispute resolution through the State Administrative Court (PTUN) and the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia within Indonesia's administrative law system. It employs a normative-doctrinal legal research design supported by comparative analysis of statutory instruments, doctrinal literature, and institutional frameworks governing administrative justice. The findings indicate a structural dichotomy between PTUN as a judicial body producing binding decisions and the Ombudsman as a supervisory institution issuing non-binding recommendations. This divergence generates an enforcement gap, particularly in the execution of PTUN judgments and the voluntary nature of Ombudsman compliance. The study further reveals fragmented coordination between both institutions, despite overlapping jurisdictional objects in administrative disputes. Such fragmentation reduces the overall effectiveness of administrative justice in ensuring legal certainty, accessibility, and substantive fairness. The research concludes that neither mechanism independently achieves optimal effectiveness without institutional integration. Strengthening normative harmonization, improving enforcement mechanisms, and clarifying procedural linkages are necessary to enhance system performance and public legal protection. The study contributes to administrative law discourse by proposing a conceptual framework for integrated administrative justice combining adjudicative and supervisory functions.

Keywords: Administrative Justice, PTUN, Ombudsman, Effectiveness, Dispute Resolution.



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INTRODUCTION

Global governance systems are increasingly characterized by a dual movement toward judicialization of administrative disputes and the parallel strengthening of quasi-judicial oversight institutions, reflecting a broader shift in comparative administrative law toward hybrid models of dispute resolution that integrate formal adjudication and soft-law mechanisms within public accountability frameworks (Kameo & Prasetyo, 2020; Aziza & Sulastri, 2026). Within this trajectory, the dichotomy between court-based adjudication and ombudsman-style oversight has become a defining feature of modern administrative justice systems, particularly in jurisdictions seeking to reconcile legal certainty with accessibility and substantive fairness. In Indonesia, this evolution is manifested through the coexistence of the State Administrative Court (PTUN) as a judicial organ and the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia as an independent supervisory body, both of which operate within the broader constitutional commitment to good governance and protection of citizens against maladministration (Nisa & Hasanah, 2025). The increasing reliance on these dual mechanisms reflects not only institutional diversification but also an emerging normative expectation that administrative justice must simultaneously satisfy legality, responsiveness, and efficiency in public service delivery.

Scholarly discourse on PTUN and the Ombudsman has developed along relatively distinct analytical trajectories, with PTUN predominantly examined through the lens of judicial review, legality control, and binding adjudication, while the Ombudsman is commonly positioned within frameworks of administrative supervision and maladministration correction. Empirical and doctrinal studies indicate that PTUN provides strong legal certainty through enforceable judgments, yet remains constrained by procedural rigidity and enforcement deficits in execution stages (Nurtjahjo, 2016). Conversely, research on the Ombudsman highlights its accessibility, informal procedural design, and effectiveness in mediating administrative grievances, although its recommendations lack coercive legal force and depend heavily on institutional compliance (Firdaus & Aminullah, 2025; Semar & Martien, 2025).

Complementing this, broader analyses emphasize the Ombudsman's role in strengthening public accountability systems, particularly through oversight of maladministration and improvement of service delivery standards (Hidayat, 2021). These findings collectively illustrate a fragmented scholarly understanding in which each institution is often evaluated in isolation, thereby limiting the development of an integrated analytical framework capable of capturing their functional interdependence.

Despite the richness of existing literature, several conceptual and empirical inconsistencies persist, particularly regarding the normative hierarchy and functional complementarity between PTUN decisions and Ombudsman recommendations. A significant strand of scholarship acknowledges the theoretical distinction between binding judicial decisions and non-binding supervisory outputs, yet fails to adequately address the systemic consequences of weak enforcement mechanisms across both institutions (Dahlena, 2016). At the empirical level, studies reveal recurring implementation gaps, including non-compliance with PTUN judgments and selective adoption of Ombudsman recommendations, which collectively undermine the coherence of administrative justice enforcement (Putri & Saputra, 2025). Furthermore, the literature exhibits conceptual ambiguity in defining effectiveness, as some studies equate it with procedural efficiency while others prioritize normative compliance or perceived fairness, resulting in inconsistent evaluative benchmarks that hinder comparative assessment between litigation and non-litigation mechanisms (Aziza & Sulastri, 2026). These inconsistencies suggest the absence of a unified theoretical lens capable of explaining how two structurally different institutions operate within a single dispute resolution ecosystem.

The persistence of these gaps generates substantial implications for both legal theory and administrative practice, particularly in contexts where citizens increasingly rely on administrative justice mechanisms to challenge governmental decisions affecting fundamental rights and public services. The inability of PTUN judgments to guarantee effective execution, combined with the non-binding nature of Ombudsman recommendations, creates a structural vulnerability in the protection of legal rights against administrative arbitrariness, thereby weakening the normative promise of the rule of law in administrative governance (Nisa & Hasanah, 2025). At the same time, the growing volume of maladministration complaints recorded in national oversight reports indicates rising public dependence on Ombudsman mechanisms, even in situations that may ultimately require judicial resolution, signaling a functional overlap that is not yet institutionally harmonized (Ombudsman Republik Indonesia, 2022). This duality reveals an urgent need to reassess the operational boundaries and interaction patterns between adjudicative and supervisory institutions, particularly in light of increasing demands for accessible, timely, and enforceable administrative justice.

Within this intellectual landscape, the present study positions itself as an integrative inquiry that moves beyond isolated institutional analysis toward a relational examination of PTUN and the Ombudsman as interconnected components of Indonesia's administrative dispute resolution architecture. Rather than treating effectiveness as an attribute inherent to each institution, this research conceptualizes it as an emergent outcome shaped by structural interaction, enforcement dynamics, and institutional complementarities within a shared governance framework (Hidayat, 2021; Nurtjahjo, 2016). This repositioning allows for a more nuanced understanding of administrative justice that accounts for both legal formalism and administrative pragmatism, while simultaneously addressing the systemic tensions between binding adjudication and persuasive oversight mechanisms. In doing so, the study seeks to reframe the discourse from institutional competition to systemic integration within administrative law theory.

The objective of this research is to critically examine and compare the effectiveness of PTUN and Ombudsman mechanisms in resolving administrative disputes, while also constructing a conceptual framework for their functional integration within Indonesia's administrative justice system. The study aims to contribute theoretically by developing an integrative model of hybrid administrative justice that bridges judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms, and methodologically by employing a normative-comparative legal analysis that synthesizes statutory interpretation with institutional evaluation to assess effectiveness beyond doctrinal boundaries.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study is designed as a non-empirical legal research, specifically adopting a normative-dogmatic approach combined with a comparative legal analysis framework. The primary sources of legal materials consist of statutory instruments governing administrative justice, particularly laws

regulating the State Administrative Court (PTUN) and the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, alongside secondary legal materials including scholarly articles, doctrinal writings, judicial interpretations, and policy reports that elaborate on administrative dispute resolution mechanisms. The research also incorporates conceptual materials derived from administrative law theory, principles of good governance, and comparative perspectives on ombudsman and administrative court systems across jurisdictions. These materials are collected through comprehensive library-based research (library research), utilizing both printed and digital legal databases to ensure doctrinal completeness and conceptual depth.

The analytical framework employed in this study is grounded in qualitative doctrinal interpretation, combining systematic legal interpretation, grammatical and teleological analysis, and comparative institutional evaluation. The study further applies a conceptual synthesis approach to assess the functional relationship between adjudicative mechanisms (PTUN) and non-adjudicative supervisory mechanisms (Ombudsman), particularly in relation to effectiveness, enforceability, and accessibility in administrative dispute resolution. Validity of legal reasoning is maintained through triangulation of doctrinal sources, consistency checks across statutory provisions and scholarly interpretations, and critical evaluation of normative coherence within administrative law structures. This approach enables the formulation of a structured analytical model that evaluates effectiveness not merely as procedural compliance, but as a multidimensional construct encompassing legal certainty, administrative responsiveness, and institutional synergy.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Normative-Doctrinal Construction of PTUN and Ombudsman Authority in Administrative Dispute Resolution

The institutional architecture of administrative dispute resolution in Indonesia is grounded in a normative evolution of state authority that distinguishes adjudicative control from supervisory oversight within public law governance. The State Administrative Court (PTUN) is normatively constructed under Law No. 5 of 1986 as amended by Law No. 9 of 2004 and Law No. 51 of 2009, which establishes judicial authority to examine, adjudicate, and annul administrative decisions classified as concrete, individual, and final. Ombudsman authority, by contrast, is constitutionally derived and operationalized under Law No. 37 of 2008 concerning the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, which mandates oversight of maladministration through non-binding recommendations. The doctrinal divergence between both institutions reflects a structural dualism in administrative justice, where legality control is separated from service-oriented corrective governance. Such separation generates an inherent normative tension between binding judicial review and persuasive administrative supervision within a unified legal system.

The normative foundation of PTUN jurisdiction is explicitly regulated under Article 1 paragraph (9) of Law No. 51 of 2009, which defines State Administrative Decisions as the object of judicial review, while Article 47 establishes the competence of PTUN to adjudicate disputes arising from such decisions. The Ombudsman, under Article 8 of Law No. 37 of 2008, is empowered to receive reports, investigate maladministration, and issue recommendations without coercive enforceability. This structural asymmetry is doctrinally significant because it creates differentiated legal effects between judicial rulings and administrative recommendations. Scholars such as Nurtjahjo (2016) emphasize that this dualism produces two distinct epistemologies of administrative justice, one rooted in legality control and the other in ethical-administrative correction. The coexistence of both systems therefore reflects a hybrid governance model that is not fully harmonized at the normative level.

A systematic interpretation of Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration further complicates the relationship between PTUN and Ombudsman by expanding administrative discretion while simultaneously strengthening oversight mechanisms. Article 21 of Law No. 30 of 2014 grants administrative courts authority to test abuse of power, while Articles 80–81 introduce internal administrative remedies prior to judicial proceedings. This layered structure suggests a legislative intention to prioritize administrative resolution before litigation, thereby positioning Ombudsman mechanisms as potentially complementary instruments. However, doctrinal ambiguity persists regarding whether Ombudsman recommendations constitute part of administrative remedies or external supervisory outputs. This ambiguity contributes to inconsistent institutional practice and fragmented enforcement logic in administrative dispute resolution.

Table 1. Normative Comparison of PTUN and Ombudsman Authority

No.	Aspect of Comparison	State Administrative Court (PTUN)	Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia
1	Legal Basis	Law No. 5 of 1986 jo. Law No. 9 of 2004 jo. Law No. 51 of 2009	Law No. 37 of 2008
2	Object of Jurisdiction	Administrative decisions (Keputusan Tata Usaha Negara/KTUN)	Maladministration in public service administration
3	Legal Output	Binding, final, and enforceable judicial judgment	Non-binding recommendation
4	Enforcement Mechanism	Judicial execution mechanism under administrative court system	Moral persuasion and administrative compliance mechanism
5	Normative Character	Adjudicative-judicial authority (binding legal force)	Supervisory-advisory authority (persuasive legal force)

The table demonstrates a fundamental asymmetry in normative force between PTUN and Ombudsman institutional outputs. The binding nature of PTUN decisions under Article 97 of Law No. 5 of 1986 contrasts sharply with the persuasive character of Ombudsman recommendations under Article 14 of Law No. 37 of 2008. This disparity generates a legal gap in enforcement effectiveness that is repeatedly highlighted in doctrinal scholarship. Dahlena (2016) argues that Ombudsman oversight over PTUN decisions remains dependent on voluntary compliance, which weakens institutional coherence. The normative gap illustrated in the table becomes central to understanding structural inefficiencies in administrative justice enforcement.

Judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court strengthens PTUN authority through execution doctrines, yet enforcement remains contingent on administrative compliance rather than coercive judicial power. Article 116 of Law No. 51 of 2009 introduces sanctions such as forced payments and administrative coercion, but implementation remains inconsistent in practice. Rayhan and Wijaya (2023) emphasize that PTUN effectiveness is undermined by execution deficits despite normative clarity in statutory provisions. This inconsistency indicates a disconnect between formal legal structure and operational enforcement capacity. The doctrinal tension reveals that judicial authority in administrative disputes is not self-executing in practical governance contexts.

The Ombudsman system, as analyzed through Article 7 and Article 8 of Law No. 37 of 2008, operates within a preventive-corrective paradigm rather than adjudicative logic. Hidayat (2021) argues that this institutional design reflects a shift toward administrative responsiveness rather than coercive legality enforcement. Semar and Martien (2025) further emphasize that Ombudsman effectiveness depends on institutional cooperation rather than legal compulsion. This reliance on compliance introduces structural vulnerability in enforcement outcomes. The normative consequence is a dependency model of governance correction rather than an autonomous enforcement mechanism.

Theoretical discourse on administrative justice, particularly through the lens of Kameo and Prasetyo (2020), situates PTUN and Ombudsman within a broader framework of dignified justice, where legal certainty and substantive fairness must be balanced. However, statutory design does not fully integrate these normative ideals into a unified procedural architecture. Aziza and Sulastri (2026) identify tension between judicial authority and supervisory authority, particularly in overlapping jurisdictional domains. This tension manifests in institutional uncertainty regarding hierarchical superiority between court decisions and Ombudsman recommendations. The absence of normative integration weakens systemic coherence in administrative dispute resolution.

Empirical doctrinal observations suggest that administrative disputes involving civil servants and public service users frequently traverse both PTUN and Ombudsman channels, as reflected in Nisa and Hasanah (2025). This dual pathway indicates functional overlap rather than clear institutional separation. Marselia and Alamsyah (2025) note that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms increasingly interact with formal adjudication systems in administrative law practice. Such interaction

creates hybrid procedural trajectories that are not explicitly regulated in statutory frameworks. The resulting fragmentation affects predictability and legal certainty in dispute resolution outcomes.

Simanjuntak (2025) highlights the urgency of harmonizing Ombudsman authority with administrative court jurisdiction to prevent institutional conflict and normative duplication. Junita et al. (2026) further argue that amendments to administrative governance law have expanded PTUN competence without simultaneously clarifying Ombudsman integration. This legislative asymmetry generates interpretive uncertainty in legal practice. The lack of harmonization produces parallel systems that operate without clear procedural hierarchy. Consequently, administrative justice becomes structurally decentralized without coordinated enforcement logic.

The normative analysis of PTUN and Ombudsman reveals a dual-track administrative justice system characterized by asymmetrical authority, fragmented enforcement, and incomplete institutional integration. Both institutions operate under distinct legal rationalities that prioritize either binding adjudication or persuasive correction. This structural configuration generates systemic inefficiencies that cannot be resolved within isolated institutional reforms. The doctrinal trajectory indicates a need for integrative legal design that aligns judicial enforcement with supervisory compliance. Such a trajectory forms the analytical foundation for evaluating effectiveness in subsequent sections.

Normative Effectiveness and Enforcement Dissonance in PTUN and Ombudsman Mechanisms

The effectiveness of administrative dispute resolution within the PTUN and Ombudsman framework is normatively anchored in the legal capacity of each institution to produce enforceable outcomes that reflect both procedural legitimacy and substantive compliance with administrative law principles. PTUN, under Article 97 of Law No. 5 of 1986 as amended by Law No. 51 of 2009, is designed to deliver binding judgments that should ensure legal certainty through judicial enforcement mechanisms. Ombudsman authority, regulated under Articles 7–14 of Law No. 37 of 2008, operates through recommendations that are intended to correct maladministration without coercive force. This structural divergence creates an inherent asymmetry in effectiveness measurement, as enforceability becomes a decisive variable distinguishing judicial from supervisory mechanisms. Rayhan and Wijaya (2023) emphasize that PTUN effectiveness cannot be separated from execution capacity, while Ombudsman effectiveness is tied to institutional responsiveness rather than legal compulsion.

The normative promise of PTUN as a guarantor of legal certainty is significantly shaped by its position within the judicial hierarchy as regulated in Article 47 of Law No. 5 of 1986, which grants authority to adjudicate administrative disputes conclusively. However, enforcement of PTUN judgments under Article 116 of Law No. 51 of 2009 reveals structural limitations, particularly in relation to compliance by administrative officials. Amalia et al. (2024) identify persistent non-compliance as a systemic issue that undermines the authority of administrative courts. This condition reflects a doctrinal gap between formal adjudicative authority and practical execution capacity. The effectiveness of PTUN therefore becomes contingent upon administrative obedience rather than inherent coercive power.

Table 2. Effectiveness Indicators of PTUN and Ombudsman Mechanisms

No.	Indicator	State Administrative Court (PTUN)	Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia
1	Legal Certainty	High level due to binding and final judicial judgment	Moderate, based on recommendatory outputs without binding force
2	Execution Strength	Dependent on administrative compliance and execution mechanisms under Law No. 51/2009	Dependent on voluntary institutional compliance and administrative goodwill
3	Procedural Speed	Relatively slow due to formal litigation stages and procedural hierarchy	Relatively fast and flexible through non-litigation procedures
4	Accessibility	Limited by procedural complexity, legal costs, and formal requirements	High accessibility through simple complaint-based mechanisms

No.	Indicator	State Administrative Court (PTUN)	Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia
5	Compliance Level	Variable and often hindered by non-compliance of administrative officials	Inconsistent implementation depending on institutional responsiveness

The table illustrates a structural paradox in administrative justice effectiveness, where normative strength does not automatically translate into execution reliability. PTUN demonstrates high legal certainty but suffers from enforcement deficits, while Ombudsman mechanisms exhibit procedural efficiency but lack binding force. Firdaus and Aminullah (2025) argue that Ombudsman effectiveness is significantly shaped by structural constraints that limit follow-up enforcement of recommendations. This imbalance highlights the absence of a unified enforcement architecture within administrative dispute resolution. The divergence in indicators confirms that effectiveness must be evaluated as a multidimensional construct rather than a singular legal attribute.

The enforcement weakness of PTUN decisions is closely related to institutional dependency on executive compliance, as mandated under Article 116 paragraphs (3)–(5) of Law No. 51 of 2009, which provides for administrative sanctions and forced payments but lacks autonomous execution mechanisms. Suhariyanto (2019) conceptualizes this limitation as a structural absence of contempt of court enforcement in administrative judiciary systems. This absence weakens the deterrent effect of judicial rulings against non-compliant officials. Consequently, PTUN judgments often function as normative declarations rather than operational commands. The resulting enforcement dissonance reduces the transformative capacity of administrative adjudication.

Ombudsman effectiveness, while procedurally more flexible, is constrained by the non-binding nature of its recommendations as stipulated in Article 8 of Law No. 37 of 2008. Putri and Saputra (2025) demonstrate that institutional response to Ombudsman recommendations varies significantly across administrative bodies, creating uneven compliance patterns. This variability undermines the predictability of administrative correction outcomes. The absence of coercive enforcement mechanisms places reliance on moral persuasion and bureaucratic goodwill. Such reliance generates structural fragility in ensuring consistent administrative accountability.

The interaction between PTUN and Ombudsman mechanisms reflects a layered governance structure in which administrative disputes may traverse both supervisory and adjudicative pathways. Nurtjahjo (2016) identifies this duality as a theoretical distinction between legality control and maladministration correction. However, in practice, the boundary between both mechanisms becomes increasingly blurred due to overlapping complaint objects and institutional mandates. Simanjuntak (2025) argues that this overlap creates normative ambiguity in determining procedural precedence. The lack of clear sequencing rules reduces systemic efficiency in dispute resolution.

The normative framework of Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration introduces administrative remedies as a prerequisite for judicial review, particularly under Articles 75–78, thereby influencing the effectiveness trajectory of both PTUN and Ombudsman mechanisms. This statutory requirement positions administrative resolution as an intermediate stage before litigation. Kurniawan et al. (2025) highlight that such layering is intended to reduce judicial burden while enhancing administrative accountability. However, the absence of strict enforcement mechanisms for administrative remedies weakens their practical effectiveness. The result is a procedural hierarchy that is normatively clear but operationally fragile.

The effectiveness discourse must also consider institutional capacity disparities, particularly in terms of human resources, procedural infrastructure, and administrative responsiveness. Ombudsman reports indicate recurring limitations in regional office capacity, which affect the speed and quality of maladministration handling (Ombudsman Republik Indonesia, 2022). These constraints directly influence the consistency of recommendation follow-up processes. Hidayat (2021) emphasizes that strengthening Ombudsman institutional capacity is essential for improving oversight effectiveness. Without such strengthening, supervisory mechanisms risk becoming symbolically authoritative but practically limited.

From a doctrinal perspective, the effectiveness gap between PTUN and Ombudsman reflects an unresolved tension between formal legality and substantive justice. Nisa and Hasanah (2025) argue that

administrative justice systems must simultaneously ensure protection of rights and administrative accountability. However, current statutory arrangements prioritize procedural separation over functional integration. Marselia and Alamsyah (2025) suggest that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms could bridge this gap if structurally integrated with judicial pathways. The absence of such integration perpetuates systemic inefficiencies.

The effectiveness analysis of PTUN and Ombudsman demonstrates that both institutions operate within partially functional but structurally incomplete enforcement ecosystems. PTUN provides normative certainty without guaranteed execution, while Ombudsman ensures accessibility without binding authority. This dual deficiency indicates that effectiveness cannot be fully realized within isolated institutional frameworks. A systemic recalibration is required to align enforcement capacity with normative authority. The analysis establishes a foundation for examining broader structural and integrative reforms in administrative dispute resolution.

Institutional Fragmentation and Normative Integration of PTUN–Ombudsman in Administrative Justice Reform

The structural configuration of administrative dispute resolution in Indonesia reveals an ongoing tension between judicial adjudication and supervisory oversight, particularly within the interaction between PTUN and the Ombudsman as regulated under Law No. 5 of 1986 jo. Law No. 51 of 2009 and Law No. 37 of 2008. This dual institutional design reflects a normative aspiration to balance legal certainty with administrative responsiveness in public governance. However, the absence of a unified enforcement architecture generates institutional fragmentation that affects the coherence of administrative justice delivery. Aziza and Sulastri (2026) emphasize that this dualism produces both synergy and tension, particularly in the overlapping domains of administrative accountability. The resulting structure is characterized by parallel authority without fully integrated procedural sequencing.

The normative relationship between PTUN and Ombudsman is further complicated by Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration, particularly Articles 75–78, which establish administrative remedies as pre-litigation mechanisms. These provisions theoretically position Ombudsman processes as complementary to judicial review under PTUN jurisdiction. However, the absence of explicit hierarchical linkage between Ombudsman recommendations and PTUN judgments creates interpretive ambiguity. Simanjuntak (2025) identifies this condition as a failure of institutional harmonization in administrative law architecture. The legal framework thus demonstrates procedural layering without normative consolidation.

Table 3. Structural Integration Challenges between PTUN and Ombudsman

No.	Dimension	State Administrative Court (PTUN)	Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia
1	Institutional Role	Judicial adjudication of administrative disputes based on binding legal authority	Supervisory mechanism for maladministration through non-adjudicative oversight
2	Normative Position	Final dispute resolution authority with binding legal effect	Non-final corrective authority with recommendatory character
3	Procedural Linkage	Weak integration with administrative remedies under Law No. 30 of 2014	Informal linkage to judicial proceedings without procedural hierarchy
4	Enforcement Path	Judicial execution mechanism regulated under Law No. 51 of 2009	Voluntary compliance mechanism based on institutional goodwill
5	Systemic Coordination	Limited inter-institutional coordination within administrative justice system	Dependent on external administrative and bureaucratic cooperation

The table illustrates a structural misalignment between adjudicative and supervisory institutions within the administrative justice system. PTUN functions as a final authority in legal dispute resolution, whereas Ombudsman operates within a corrective-preventive paradigm without binding force.

Kurniawan et al. (2025) argue that this asymmetry creates coordination deficits that weaken overall administrative accountability. The lack of procedural integration between both mechanisms reduces systemic efficiency. The institutional gap further reflects incomplete realization of administrative justice harmonization.

The doctrinal foundation of PTUN authority under Article 47 of Law No. 5 of 1986 establishes judicial competence to resolve disputes arising from administrative decisions, yet its effectiveness is constrained by execution limitations under Article 116 of Law No. 51 of 2009. Amalia et al. (2024) highlight that enforcement deficits remain a critical obstacle in realizing judicial supremacy in administrative law. This limitation is exacerbated by the absence of contempt of court mechanisms specifically designed for administrative adjudication. Suhariyanto (2019) emphasizes that such structural gaps weaken judicial authority in governing executive compliance. The resulting condition reflects partial institutional authority rather than complete judicial control.

Ombudsman authority under Article 7 of Law No. 37 of 2008 is designed to function as a preventive and corrective oversight mechanism over maladministration in public services. Putri and Saputra (2025) demonstrate that effectiveness of Ombudsman recommendations is highly dependent on institutional responsiveness and bureaucratic compliance culture. This dependency creates variability in implementation outcomes across different administrative bodies. Firdaus and Aminullah (2025) further note that regional disparities in institutional capacity significantly affect complaint resolution effectiveness. The absence of coercive enforcement reduces the normative strength of Ombudsman outputs.

The interaction between PTUN and Ombudsman reflects a fragmented dispute resolution ecosystem in which overlapping jurisdictional domains are not clearly delineated. Nurtjahjo (2016) conceptualizes this dual structure as a theoretical separation between legality control and maladministration correction. However, empirical practice demonstrates frequent convergence of complaint objects, particularly in administrative disputes involving public officials. Marselia and Alamsyah (2025) argue that such convergence necessitates alternative dispute resolution integration within administrative law systems. The lack of clear procedural sequencing exacerbates institutional inefficiency.

The effectiveness of administrative justice is further influenced by the implementation of Law No. 30 of 2014, which introduces internal administrative remedies as mandatory pre-litigation steps. Article 76 of the statute requires exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial review, thereby indirectly linking Ombudsman processes with PTUN jurisdiction. Junita et al. (2026) argue that this layered mechanism is intended to reduce judicial burden while enhancing administrative accountability. However, the absence of enforcement sanctions for non-compliance with administrative remedies weakens its normative force. The procedural hierarchy remains conceptually structured but practically inconsistent.

Ombudsman institutional reports indicate persistent challenges in follow-up compliance and inter-agency coordination, particularly in handling complex maladministration cases (Ombudsman Republik Indonesia, 2022). Hidayat (2021) emphasizes that strengthening institutional capacity and legal authority is essential to improving oversight effectiveness. However, capacity limitations at regional levels continue to hinder uniform implementation of recommendations. Semar and Martien (2025) highlight that effectiveness is closely tied to institutional professionalism and procedural consistency. These limitations reinforce structural dependency on executive goodwill.

From a normative perspective, the absence of integration between PTUN and Ombudsman creates a fragmented accountability system that undermines administrative justice coherence. Nisa and Hasanah (2025) argue that legal protection in administrative disputes requires both adjudicative certainty and supervisory responsiveness. However, current legal frameworks prioritize institutional separation rather than functional integration. Aziza and Sulastri (2026) highlight that such separation produces both synergy and tension without resolving structural inconsistencies. The system thus operates under dual logic without unified enforcement design.

The overall analysis demonstrates that administrative justice in Indonesia is characterized by institutional dualism without full normative integration between PTUN and Ombudsman mechanisms. Both institutions perform essential but partially overlapping roles in ensuring administrative accountability and legal protection. However, enforcement fragmentation and procedural ambiguity reduce the effectiveness of dispute resolution outcomes. Kameo and Prasetyo (2020) emphasize that

justice systems must achieve a balance between certainty and substantive fairness to maintain legitimacy. The absence of such integration underscores the necessity of systemic reform toward a harmonized administrative justice framework.

CONCLUSION

The analysis demonstrates that administrative dispute resolution in Indonesia operates through a dual institutional structure consisting of PTUN as a judicial adjudicator and the Ombudsman as a supervisory corrective body, both of which are normatively designed to ensure legal protection in administrative governance but function under fundamentally different enforcement logics. PTUN, grounded in Law No. 5 of 1986 jo. Law No. 51 of 2009, provides binding judicial certainty yet faces persistent execution deficits due to weak coercive enforcement mechanisms, while the Ombudsman, under Law No. 37 of 2008, offers accessible and responsive complaint handling but lacks legally enforceable authority over its recommendations. The interaction between both institutions is further complicated by Law No. 30 of 2014, which introduces layered administrative remedies without establishing clear hierarchical integration, resulting in procedural fragmentation and inconsistent dispute resolution pathways. Across doctrinal interpretation and comparative institutional analysis, effectiveness emerges not as an inherent attribute of either institution but as a systemic outcome shaped by enforcement capacity, institutional coordination, and normative coherence. Consequently, the absence of integrated enforcement architecture undermines the realization of legal certainty and substantive justice within administrative law. Strengthening synchronization between adjudicative and supervisory mechanisms becomes essential to construct a coherent administrative justice system capable of delivering both enforceable legal outcomes and accessible administrative accountability.

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