Corpus: International Journal of Law and Political Authority
Vol 1 No 1 January 2026, Hal 27-35
ISSN: XXXX-XXXX (Print) ISSN: XXXX-XXXX (Electronic)
Open Access: https://researchfrontiers.id/corpus

Corruption and Governance: Evidence from Southeast Asian Countries

Fred-Jaiyesimi[1*]
[1] Olabisi Onabanjo University, Nigeria
email: Jaiyesimiaa@gmail.com[1]

Article Info :
Received:
26-11-2025
Revised:
29-12-2025
Accepted:
25-01-2026

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between corruption and governance in Southeast Asian countries through a comparative and sectoral perspective. Drawing on prior empirical research, official reports, and institutional analyses, the study explores how variations in governance quality shape corruption dynamics across political, administrative, and economic domains. The findings indicate that corruption is sustained not solely by weak legal frameworks but by structural governance deficiencies, including limited institutional autonomy, selective enforcement, and entrenched political economic networks. Sectoral evidence from health services, education, public procurement, environmental governance, and corporate regulation demonstrates that governance failures translate directly into reduced service quality, fiscal inefficiency, and constrained development outcomes. Comparative analysis of anti corruption policy instruments further reveals that reforms achieve meaningful impact only when embedded within coherent governance systems characterized by accountability, transparency, and rule of law credibility. The study contributes to governance scholarship by highlighting the limits of fragmented reform approaches and emphasizing the centrality of institutional integrity in corruption control. These findings offer policy-relevant insights for designing context-sensitive and sustainable governance reforms in Southeast Asia..

Keywords: *Corruption, Governance, Southeast Asia, Institutional Quality, Public Sector Reform.*

INTRODUCTION

Corruption has long been recognized as a persistent structural challenge shaping governance trajectories across Southeast Asian countries, where diverse political systems coexist with shared historical and institutional legacies. Scholarly inquiry has consistently demonstrated that corruption is not merely a legal or moral deviation, but a phenomenon deeply embedded in governance arrangements and power relations. Comparative studies highlight how variations in state capacity, administrative traditions, and political accountability influence both the prevalence and forms of corrupt practices (Quah, 2003; Callahan, 2000). This body of scholarship positions corruption as a central lens through which governance performance in the region must be understood.

Governance frameworks in Southeast Asia have evolved through processes of decentralization, democratization, and economic liberalization, each producing complex implications for corruption control. Research on corporate governance reveals that weak oversight mechanisms and limited enforcement capacity often allow rent-seeking behavior to persist within both public and private institutions (Wijayati, Hermes, & Holzhacker, 2015). Empirical evidence suggests that governance reforms may generate uneven outcomes, particularly when formal rules are not accompanied by normative and institutional change. Such dynamics underscore the importance of examining corruption within broader governance ecosystems rather than as an isolated pathology.

Sectoral analyses further illuminate how corruption undermines service delivery and public trust, especially in critical domains such as health and education. Studies focusing on frontline public services demonstrate that governance failures facilitate informal payments, favoritism, and resource leakage, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations (Naher et al., 2020). Similar patterns emerge in higher education systems, where governance deficits shape institutional behavior and accountability cultures (Welch, 2020). These findings emphasize that corruption's consequences extend beyond economic inefficiency toward profound social and developmental costs.

Understanding corruption in Southeast Asia also requires attention to measurement and perception, as empirical assessments often diverge depending on methodological approaches. Comparative research on corruption indices indicates significant gaps between global perception-based measures and localized experiences of corruption (Lin & Yu, 2014). Such discrepancies complicate cross-country comparisons and policy evaluations, particularly in politically and culturally heterogeneous contexts. This challenge highlights the necessity of combining quantitative indicators with contextualized qualitative analysis in governance research.

Political structures and party financing practices constitute another critical dimension in the corruption–governance nexus. Analyses of political corruption in Southeast Asia demonstrate how electoral competition, patronage networks, and campaign financing arrangements create incentives for illicit exchanges (Callahan, 2000). These patterns are often reinforced by weak regulatory oversight and limited transparency, allowing corruption to become routinized within political processes. Governance reforms that overlook these political foundations risk addressing symptoms rather than underlying drivers.

Efforts to combat corruption across Southeast Asia reveal a wide spectrum of institutional responses and degrees of effectiveness. Comparative evaluations of anti-corruption agencies show that legal mandates, political support, and operational independence significantly shape outcomes (Quah, 2016; Wescott, 2003). Countries that combine enforcement with preventive and educational strategies tend to demonstrate more sustainable progress. These experiences offer valuable insights into how governance design influences the resilience of anti-corruption initiatives.

Recent empirical studies increasingly link governance quality and corruption control to broader economic and investment outcomes. Evidence from Southeast Asian economies indicates that corruption levels interact with political stability, public expenditure, and foreign investment decisions in shaping growth trajectories (Rosli & Kamaluddin, 2023). This relationship suggests that corruption is not only a governance concern but also a determinant of regional competitiveness. Such findings reinforce the strategic importance of governance reform in development planning.

Against this backdrop, the present study situates corruption as a core governance issue within Southeast Asia, drawing on comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives. By synthesizing insights from political, economic, and sectoral analyses, the research seeks to deepen understanding of how governance structures mediate corruption dynamics across national contexts. The study contributes to ongoing debates by emphasizing evidence-based analysis rooted in regional specificity. In doing so, it aims to inform both scholarly discourse and policy-oriented governance reform efforts in Southeast Asian countries.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a qualitative-comparative research design grounded in doctrinal and empirical governance analysis to examine the relationship between corruption and governance across selected Southeast Asian countries. The research systematically analyzes secondary data drawn from peer-reviewed journal articles, comparative governance reports, and institutional studies to capture variations in corruption patterns, governance structures, and policy responses at the regional level. A comparative analytical framework is applied to identify convergences and divergences among countries with differing political systems, administrative capacities, and anti-corruption regimes, while thematic synthesis is used to integrate evidence across sectors such as public administration, political institutions, and service delivery. To ensure analytical rigor, the study emphasizes contextual interpretation and cross-source triangulation, allowing governance outcomes to be assessed in relation to institutional design, enforcement mechanisms, and socio-political conditions specific to Southeast Asia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Institutional Governance Structures and Corruption Dynamics in Southeast Asia

Institutional governance in Southeast Asia reflects a complex interaction between formal legal frameworks and deeply embedded political–economic arrangements that shape corruption outcomes. Comparative scholarship has long demonstrated that corruption in the region cannot be reduced to administrative weakness alone, but is closely tied to the configuration of state power, elite bargaining, and regulatory discretion (Quah, 2003; Lim & Stern, 2002). Governance institutions often operate within hybrid systems where modern bureaucratic norms coexist with patron–client relations. This structural hybridity explains why similar anti-corruption laws yield divergent results across countries.

Decentralization reforms, while designed to enhance accountability and service responsiveness, have frequently produced mixed governance effects. Evidence from Indonesia and neighboring states shows that devolving authority without parallel strengthening of oversight institutions has widened opportunities for rent extraction at subnational levels (Wijayati, Hermes, & Holzhacker, 2015; Wescott, 2003). Local political elites often capture regulatory processes, particularly in procurement and licensing. Governance quality, therefore, depends less on the presence of decentralized authority than on the integrity of institutions that supervise it.

Political institutions play a decisive role in shaping corruption incentives through party financing systems, electoral competition, and legislative oversight. Studies of political corruption illustrate how opaque campaign financing and weak disclosure requirements normalize illicit exchanges between business actors and political elites (Callahan, 2000; Ratanabanangkoon & Thananusak, 2025). These dynamics undermine institutional credibility and weaken rule enforcement. Governance reforms that overlook political financing structures tend to deliver only symbolic compliance.

Corporate governance arrangements further reveal how institutional design affects corruption risks across Southeast Asia. Weak board independence, concentrated ownership structures, and limited minority shareholder protection have been linked to higher corruption exposure within firms (Ratu, 2024; Wijayati et al., 2015). Corporate–state relationships frequently blur regulatory boundaries, enabling preferential treatment and regulatory capture. This interaction demonstrates that corruption governance must extend beyond the public sector into private regulatory ecosystems.

Measurement debates provide additional insight into institutional performance, as global indicators often fail to capture local governance realities. Comparative analyses show that perception-based indices may understate everyday corruption embedded in administrative routines and informal norms (Lin & Yu, 2014). Localized studies, by contrast, reveal sector-specific vulnerabilities that aggregate scores obscure. Governance evaluation, therefore, requires sensitivity to institutional context and scale.

Sectoral governance failures illustrate how institutional weaknesses translate into tangible social costs. In public health systems, governance gaps facilitate informal payments, absenteeism, and misallocation of resources, directly affecting service quality and equity (Naher et al., 2020). Similar patterns emerge in higher education, where governance deficits allow nepotism and mismanagement to persist within universities (Welch, 2020). These sectoral outcomes underscore the distributive consequences of weak institutional governance.

The role of law enforcement and judicial independence remains central to corruption control across Southeast Asia. Comparative evidence indicates that countries with stronger rule-of-law institutions and credible sanctioning mechanisms experience more effective corruption deterrence (Quah, 2016; Mohd-Rashid et al., 2023). Selective enforcement, however, continues to undermine institutional legitimacy in several jurisdictions. Governance credibility depends on consistent application of legal norms rather than formal legal sophistication.

Environmental and natural resource governance further exposes institutional fragility in the region. Research on forestry, REDD+ initiatives, and deforestation highlights how weak governance institutions enable bribery and regulatory evasion, accelerating environmental degradation (Williams & Dupuy, 2019; Yusuf, 2023). These findings demonstrate that corruption governance intersects directly with sustainability outcomes. Institutional integrity becomes a prerequisite for effective environmental policy implementation.

Empirical studies increasingly quantify the relationship between governance quality and macroeconomic performance. Regional analyses confirm that stronger control of corruption and political stability are associated with higher investment inflows and more efficient government expenditure (Ardiyanto, 2011; Rosli & Kamaluddin, 2023; Lustrilanang et al., 2023). Institutional governance thus functions as an economic signal to domestic and foreign investors. Weak governance, conversely, raises transaction costs and uncertainty.

The table below synthesizes comparative governance indicators and corruption-related outcomes across selected Southeast Asian countries, drawing on official reports, prior empirical studies, and peer-reviewed research.

.

Table 1. Comparative Overview of Governance Structures and Corruption Impacts in Selected Southeast Asian Countries

Country	Governance Focus Area	Key Institutional Weakness	Documented Corruption Impact	Primary Sources
Indonesia	Decentralized administration	Weak subnational oversight	Local procurement corruption	Quah (2003); Wijayati et al. (2015); Jones (2009)
Philippines	Political financing	Opaque campaign funding	Regulatory capture	Callahan (2000); Lim & Stern (2002)
Thailand	Judicial enforcement	Selective prosecution	Reduced deterrence	Quah (2016); Mohd-Rashid et al. (2023)
Vietnam	State–business relations	Limited corporate transparency	Preferential treatment	Ratu (2024); Tran et al. (2021)
Malaysia	Public expenditure governance	Weak accountability mechanisms	Budget leakage	Rosli & Kamaluddin (2023); Ardiyanto (2011)

Taken together, this evidence confirms that corruption in Southeast Asia is inseparable from the quality of institutional governance. Formal reforms that neglect political economy realities tend to produce compliance without transformation. Effective governance requires coherent institutional design, credible enforcement, and alignment between public authority and private sector accountability. This institutional perspective provides the foundation for examining sector-specific and policy-driven governance dynamics in subsequent sections.

Governance Quality, Sectoral Performance, and Corruption Outcomes

Governance quality in Southeast Asia manifests most visibly through sectoral performance, where institutional integrity directly shapes policy effectiveness and public welfare. Empirical studies consistently show that corruption distorts sectoral governance by redirecting resources away from intended objectives and weakening accountability chains (Quah, 2003; Wescott, 2003). Sector-specific analysis allows corruption to be examined not as an abstract governance failure, but as a concrete mechanism influencing outcomes in health, education, procurement, and environmental management. This approach aligns governance assessment with lived institutional realities across Southeast Asian states.

Public sector service delivery offers one of the clearest illustrations of how governance failures translate into social costs. Research on frontline health services demonstrates that weak supervision, discretionary authority, and informal norms facilitate bribery and absenteeism, reducing access and quality for marginalized populations (Naher et al., 2020). Governance gaps are particularly pronounced in decentralized systems where monitoring capacity has not kept pace with administrative devolution. These findings confirm that corruption operates through everyday administrative practices rather than exceptional misconduct.

Higher education governance further reflects how sectoral institutions reproduce corruption through normalized informal arrangements. Studies of universities in East and Southeast Asia reveal patterns of favoritism, procurement irregularities, and opaque promotion systems rooted in weak institutional oversight (Welch, 2020). Governance reforms focused solely on performance metrics often fail to address these embedded practices. Sectoral integrity in education, therefore, depends on governance cultures as much as on formal regulation.

Public procurement represents another critical arena where governance quality and corruption intersect. Comparative analyses indicate that procurement processes in Southeast Asia remain vulnerable to bid rigging, collusion, and political interference, particularly in infrastructure and public works (Jones, 2009; Lim & Stern, 2002). Weak transparency mechanisms and limited enforcement capacity allow procurement corruption to persist despite regulatory reforms. Sectoral governance in procurement thus functions as a key indicator of broader institutional credibility.

Environmental governance highlights the developmental consequences of corruption across Southeast Asia. Empirical evidence links weak governance in forestry and land-use regulation to deforestation, illicit licensing, and bribery-driven resource extraction (Yusuf, 2023). Governance safeguards embedded in international initiatives such as REDD+ demonstrate mixed effectiveness when domestic institutions lack enforcement capacity (Williams & Dupuy, 2019). Environmental outcomes, therefore, reflect the cumulative effects of sectoral governance weaknesses.

Digital governance has emerged as a strategic response to sectoral corruption, particularly through the expansion of e-government systems. Cross-country studies suggest that digitalization can reduce face-to-face interactions and administrative discretion, contributing to lower corruption risks in service delivery (Suardi, 2021). Outcomes vary significantly depending on institutional readiness and data transparency standards. E-government reforms illustrate how governance innovation interacts with institutional context rather than producing automatic gains.

Corporate and sustainability governance increasingly shape sectoral integrity within Southeast Asian economies. Research demonstrates that firms operating under stronger governance and sustainability frameworks exhibit lower corruption exposure and improved compliance behavior (Tran, Beddewela, & Ntim, 2021; Ratu, 2024). Weak regulatory enforcement, however, undermines these frameworks by allowing selective compliance. Sectoral governance effectiveness thus depends on regulatory consistency across public and private domains.

Macroeconomic sectoral outcomes further reveal the governance–corruption relationship through investment and fiscal performance. Studies show that corruption distorts government expenditure allocation and discourages foreign investment by increasing uncertainty and transaction costs (Ardiyanto, 2011; Rosli & Kamaluddin, 2023). Governance quality functions as a signaling mechanism that shapes investor confidence across sectors. Persistent corruption weakens this signal, constraining long-term growth potential.

Comparative econometric evidence reinforces the importance of governance quality in shaping sectoral outcomes across ASEAN countries. Advanced panel analyses confirm that control of corruption and regulatory effectiveness exert statistically significant effects on development indicators (Lustrilanang et al., 2023). These findings align with broader rule-of-law research emphasizing enforcement credibility as a determinant of sectoral performance (Mohd-Rashid et al., 2023). Governance quality thus emerges as a cross-cutting determinant of sectoral resilience. The table below consolidates sectoral evidence on governance quality and corruption impacts in Southeast Asia, drawing from official reports, empirical studies, and prior research.

Table 2. Sectoral Governance Challenges and Corruption Impacts in Southeast Asia"

Sector	Governance Challenge	Corruption Manifestation	Documented Impact	Key References
Health Services	Weak frontline oversight	Informal payments, absenteeism	Reduced service access	Naher et al. (2020); Quah (2003)
Higher Education	Limited institutional accountability	Nepotism, procurement abuse	Declining academic integrity	Welch (2020); Ratanabanangkoon & Thananusak (2025)
Public Procurement	Opaque tender processes	Bid rigging, political favoritism	Fiscal inefficiency	Jones (2009); Lim & Stern (2002)
Environmental Management	Weak regulatory enforcement	Bribery, illegal licensing	Accelerated deforestation	Yusuf (2023); Williams & Dupuy (2019)
Digital Governance	Uneven institutional capacity	Partial transparency gains	Mixed corruption reduction	Suardi (2021); Wescott (2003)

Sectoral analysis demonstrates that corruption in Southeast Asia is sustained through governance weaknesses embedded within specific institutional domains. Improvements in aggregate governance indicators remain insufficient when sector-level institutions continue to tolerate discretionary abuse. Effective corruption control requires targeted sectoral reforms aligned with broader governance architecture. This sectoral perspective provides a critical bridge toward examining policy instruments and reform strategies in the subsequent sub-discussion.

Policy Instruments, Reform Trajectories, and Comparative Evidence of Anti-Corruption Governance

Anti-corruption governance in Southeast Asia has evolved through a diverse set of policy instruments shaped by political commitment, institutional capacity, and socio-economic context. Comparative research demonstrates that reform trajectories differ markedly across countries, reflecting variations in state autonomy, bureaucratic professionalism, and elite incentives (Quah, 2016; Lim & Stern, 2002). Anti-corruption policies often emerge as responses to legitimacy crises rather than as components of long-term governance planning. This reactive orientation explains the uneven sustainability of reform outcomes across the region.

Legal and regulatory reforms constitute the most visible policy response to corruption, frequently emphasizing criminalization and sanctioning mechanisms. Southeast Asian states have expanded anti-corruption laws, specialized courts, and prosecutorial powers, yet empirical evidence shows that formal legal strength does not automatically translate into effective deterrence (Wescott, 2003; Mohd-Rashid et al., 2023). Selective enforcement and political interference continue to weaken credibility. Governance effectiveness depends on the consistency of legal application rather than the severity of statutory provisions.

Independent anti-corruption agencies have become central pillars of reform strategies across the region. Comparative assessments reveal that agencies with operational autonomy, secure funding, and political backing demonstrate stronger investigative and preventive capacity (Quah, 2016). Conversely, agencies embedded within politicized bureaucratic hierarchies face constraints that limit their impact. Institutional independence thus emerges as a decisive governance variable rather than organizational form alone.

Administrative reforms aimed at reducing discretion and increasing transparency represent another critical policy pathway. Procurement reform, regulatory simplification, and standardized procedures have been promoted to close corruption-prone entry points within public administration (Jones, 2009). Evidence suggests that these measures yield measurable gains when accompanied by audit capacity and civil service accountability. Without enforcement, procedural reform risks becoming performative compliance.

Digital governance and e-government initiatives increasingly feature in regional anti-corruption strategies. Cross-national studies indicate that digital platforms can limit informal interactions and enhance traceability of administrative decisions, contributing to reduced corruption risks (Suardi, 2021). Outcomes remain uneven, as technological adoption does not neutralize political capture or data manipulation. Digital reforms function most effectively when embedded within broader governance accountability frameworks.

Economic and investment-oriented reforms also play a role in shaping corruption incentives. Empirical studies demonstrate that improved governance quality, regulatory predictability, and corruption control attract foreign investment and enhance fiscal efficiency (Ardiyanto, 2011; Rosli & Kamaluddin, 2023). Anti-corruption policies thus intersect with macroeconomic governance objectives. Weak reform credibility, however, continues to deter long-term investment in high-risk jurisdictions.

Sector-specific policy instruments highlight differentiated reform effectiveness across governance domains. Environmental and forestry governance reforms illustrate how international safeguards and monitoring mechanisms face domestic implementation constraints (Williams & Dupuy, 2019; Yusuf, 2023). Health and education sector reforms similarly reveal that policy design must address informal norms and frontline behavior to achieve lasting change (Naher et al., 2020; Welch, 2020). These cases underscore the limits of uniform policy prescriptions.

Corporate governance reforms increasingly complement public-sector anti-corruption strategies. Strengthened disclosure requirements, board accountability, and sustainability reporting have been linked to reduced corruption exposure in Southeast Asian firms (Wijayati et al., 2015; Tran et al., 2021;

Ratu, 2024). Regulatory inconsistency and weak enforcement, however, undermine private-sector compliance incentives. Effective governance reform requires alignment between corporate regulation and public accountability institutions.

Comparative econometric and longitudinal studies provide robust evidence on the long-term effects of governance reform. Advanced panel analyses confirm that sustained improvements in corruption control and governance quality correlate positively with development indicators across ASEAN countries (Lustrilanang et al., 2023). These findings reinforce earlier political economy analyses emphasizing institutional credibility over episodic reform (Quah, 2003; Callahan, 2000). Reform durability emerges as a central determinant of governance success. The table below summarizes key anti-corruption policy instruments, governance conditions, and observed outcomes across Southeast Asian countries, synthesizing evidence from official evaluations and prior research.

Table 3. Comparative Overview of Anti-Corruption Policy Instruments and Governance Outcomes in Southeast Asia

Policy Instrument	Governance Requirement	Implementation Challenge	Observed Outcome	Key References
Anti-Corruption Laws	Judicial independence	Selective enforcement	Limited deterrence	Wescott (2003); Mohd-Rashid et al. (2023)
Anti-Corruption Agencies	Institutional autonomy	Political interference	Uneven effectiveness	Quah (2016); Quah (2003)
Procurement Reform	Transparency and audits	Elite capture	Reduced leakage when enforced	Jones (2009); Lim & Stern (2002)
E-Government Systems	Data integrity	Partial digital adoption	Mixed corruption reduction	Suardi (2021); Wescott (2003)
Corporate Governance Reform	Regulatory consistency	Weak enforcement	Lower firm-level corruption	Wijayati et al. (2015); Ratu (2024); Tran et al. (2021)

Comparative evidence indicates that anti-corruption governance in Southeast Asia succeeds not through isolated policy instruments but through coherent reform ecosystems. Legal, administrative, digital, and corporate governance reforms demonstrate greatest impact when aligned with political commitment and institutional integrity. Fragmented or symbolic reforms, by contrast, reinforce public skepticism and governance fatigue. This synthesis affirms that sustainable corruption control remains inseparable from long-term governance transformation across Southeast Asian countries.

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that corruption in Southeast Asian countries is fundamentally intertwined with the quality of governance institutions, political incentives, and sectoral implementation capacities. Comparative evidence reveals that formal legal reforms and policy instruments yield limited impact when not supported by credible enforcement, institutional independence, and consistent political commitment. Sectoral analysis shows that corruption manifests through everyday administrative practices in public services, procurement, environmental management, and corporate regulation, producing tangible social and economic costs. The findings confirm that sustainable anti-corruption outcomes emerge from coherent governance ecosystems in which legal, administrative, digital, and corporate reforms reinforce one another. Corruption control in Southeast Asia should be understood as a long-term governance transformation process rather than a discrete policy intervention, requiring institutional credibility, accountability alignment, and contextualized reform design.

REFERENCES

Ardiyanto, F. (2011). Corruption and Investment: Evidence from Southeast Asia. *Jurnal BPPK: Badan Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Keuangan*, *2*, 63-80. https://doi.org/10.48108/jurnalbppk.v2i0.54.

Callahan, W. A. (2000). Political Corruption in Southeast Asia. In *Party Finance and Political Corruption* (pp. 163-198). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333978061_7.

Jones, D. S. (2009). Curbing corruption in government procurement in Southeast Asia: Challenges and constraints. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *17*(2), 145-172. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370903077444.

Lim, L. Y., & Stern, A. (2002). State power and private profit: The political economy of corruption in Southeast Asia. *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature*, *16*(2), 18-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8411.00120.

Lin, M. W., & Yu, C. (2014). Can corruption be measured? Comparing global versus local perceptions of corruption in East and Southeast Asia. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, *16*(2), 140-157. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2013.870115.

Lustrilanang, P., Suwarno, Darusalam, Rizki, L. T., Omar, N., & Said, J. (2023). The role of control of corruption and quality of governance in ASEAN: Evidence from DOLS and FMOLS Test. *Cogent Business & Management*, *10*(1), 2154060. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2022.2154060.

Mohd-Rashid, R., Mehmood, W., Ooi, C. A., Che Man, S. Z., & Ong, C. Z. (2023). Strengthened rule of law to reduce corruption: evidence from Asia-Pacific countries. *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, *26*(5), 989-1006. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-06-2022-0076.

Naher, N., Hoque, R., Hassan, M. S., Balabanova, D., Adams, A. M., & Ahmed, S. M. (2020). The influence of corruption and governance in the delivery of frontline health care services in the public sector: a scoping review of current and future prospects in low and middle-income countries of south and south-east Asia. *BMC public health*, *20*(1), 880. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-08975-0.

Quah, J. S. (2003). Causes and consequences of corruption in Southeast Asia: A comparative analysis of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, *25*(2), 235-266. https://doi.org/10.1080/02598272.2003.10800416.

Quah, J. S. (2016). Combating corruption in six Asian countries: a comparative analysis. *Asian education and development studies*, *5*(2), 244-262. https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-01-2016-0011.

Ratanabanangkoon, P., & Thananusak, T. (2025). Past and emerging landscape of bribery corruption research in ASEAN: bibliometric review of literature (1982–2025). *International Journal of Ethics and Systems*, 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-07-2025-0359.

Ratu, D. M. (2024). Corporate Governance And Corruption Controversies In Southeast Asia. *Akurasi: Jurnal Studi Akuntansi dan Keuangan*, *7*(1), 173-182. https://doi.org/10.29303/akurasi.v7i1.492.

Rosli, S., & Kamaluddin, A. (2023). Control of corruption, political stability, foreign investors, government expenditure and economic growth trends in the Southeast Asian Region. *IPN Journal of Research and Practice in Public Sector Accounting and Management*, *11*(1), 127-155. https://doi.org/10.58458/ipnj.v11.01.07.0073.

Suardi, I. (2021). E-Government, Governance and Corruption in Asian countries. *Emerging Markets: Business and Management Studies Journal*, *8*(2), 137-150. https://doi.org/10.33555/embm.v8i2.180.

Tran, M., Beddewela, E., & Ntim, C. G. (2021). Governance and sustainability in Southeast Asia. *Accounting Research Journal*, *34*(6), 516-545. https://doi.org/10.1108/ARJ-05-2019-0095.

Welch, A. (2020). Of Worms and woodpeckers: governance & corruption in East and Southeast Asian higher education. *Studies in Higher Education*, *45*(10), 2073-2081. https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2020.1823643.

Wescott, C. (2003). Combating Corruption in Southeast Asia. In *Fighting corruption in Asia: Causes, effects and remedies* (pp. 237-269). https://doi.org/10.1142/5169.

Wijayati, N., Hermes, N., & Holzhacker, R. (2015). Corporate governance and corruption: A comparative study of Southeast Asia. In *Decentralization and governance in Indonesia* (pp. 259-292). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22434-3_10.

Williams, D. A., & Dupuy, K. E. (2019). Will REDD+ safeguards mitigate corruption? Qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia. *The Journal of Development Studies*, *55*(10), 2129-2144. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2018.1510118.

.

Yusuf, M. (2023). Corruption, Development, and Deforestation: An Evidence From Southeast Asian Countries. *KINERJA*, *27*(2), 178-191. https://doi.org/10.24002/kinerja.v27i2.7036.